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The issue with mount-dirs.sh is that it calls /usr/lib/qubes/init/bind-dirs.sh which could execute malicious code through /rw/config/qubes-bind-dirs.d which during a previous boot could have used to place a malicious malware hook. But that's something that can be fixed upstream in Qubes by moving bind-dirs into its own systemd unit file.
Assuming that is sorted out upstream in Qubes, then Qubes-VM-Hardening could use:
Dunno if it would also need DefaultDependencies=no.
Thereby Qubes-VM-Hardening could do its thing while not risking that any applications process any potentially maliciously modified files in the private image? Then Qubes-VM-Hardening could be simplified and wouldn't require to use mount / umount itself? Do you see any loopholes in this approach?
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
My initial thought is that vm-boot-protect can't go after qubes-bind-dirs in any case, so the latter would have to go on the Before= line. And if we're letting qubes-mount-dirs handle all mounting, then I don't think rw.mount or home.mount can be on Before= line.
FWIW, this question about having upstream create a separate qubes-bind-dirs came up before. But at the time I saw no other reason for them to change, and I wanted to do what was both expedient and safe.
The issue with
mount-dirs.sh
is that it calls/usr/lib/qubes/init/bind-dirs.sh
which could execute malicious code through/rw/config/qubes-bind-dirs.d
which during a previous boot could have used to place a malicious malware hook. But that's something that can be fixed upstream in Qubes by moving bind-dirs into its own systemd unit file.Assuming that is sorted out upstream in Qubes, then Qubes-VM-Hardening could use:
Dunno if it would also need
DefaultDependencies=no
.Thereby Qubes-VM-Hardening could do its thing while not risking that any applications process any potentially maliciously modified files in the private image? Then Qubes-VM-Hardening could be simplified and wouldn't require to use mount / umount itself? Do you see any loopholes in this approach?
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: