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[SECURITY] Fix Zip Slip Vulnerability #303
[SECURITY] Fix Zip Slip Vulnerability #303
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This fixes a Zip-Slip vulnerability. This change does one of two things. This change either 1. Inserts a guard to protect against Zip Slip. OR 2. Replaces `dir.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalPath())`, which is vulnerable to partial path traversal attacks, with the more secure `dir.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(parent.getCanonicalFile().toPath())`. For number 2, consider `"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")`. The check is bypassed although `/outnot` is not under the `/out` directory. It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various `String` representations of the `File` object. For example, on Linux, `println(new File("/var"))` will print `/var`, but `println(new File("/var", "/")` will print `/var/`; however, `println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())` will print `/var`. Weakness: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Severity: High CVSSS: 7.4 Detection: CodeQL (https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/java-zipslip/) & OpenRewrite (https://public.moderne.io/recipes/org.openrewrite.java.security.ZipSlip) Reported-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Leitschuh <[email protected]> Bug-tracker: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16 Co-authored-by: Moderne <[email protected]>
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try (final OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(new File(dir, entry.getName()).toPath())) { | ||
final File zipEntryFile = new File(dir, entry.getName()); | ||
if (!zipEntryFile.toPath().normalize().startsWith(dir.toPath())) { | ||
throw new RuntimeException("Bad zip entry"); |
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Throwing a RE is an anti pattern AFIK, IllegalStateException or IllegalArgumentException would be better IMO.
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ public void testJarUnarchive() throws Exception { | |||
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ZipArchiveEntry entry = (ZipArchiveEntry)in.getNextEntry(); | |||
File o = new File(dir, entry.getName()); | |||
if (!o.toPath().normalize().startsWith(dir.toPath().normalize())) { | |||
throw new RuntimeException("Bad zip entry"); |
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Don't throw RuntimeException, it's an anti-pattern; one of ISE or IAE is likely better depending on what's at fault.
All the changes are in test classes, it seems. So this is unlikely to affect any users in production scenarios. |
I'm working on regenerating these changes with a different exception. See: |
Closing, tests are not a security risk. |
Security Vulnerability Fix
This pull request fixes a Zip Slip vulnerability either due to an insufficient, or missing guard when unzipping zip files.
Even if you deem, as the maintainer of this project, this is not necessarily fixing a security vulnerability, it is still, most likely, a valid security hardening.
Preamble
Impact
This issue allows a malicious zip file to potentially break out of the expected destination directory, writing contents into arbitrary locations on the file system.
Overwriting certain files/directories could allow an attacker to achieve remote code execution on a target system by exploiting this vulnerability.
Why?
The best description of Zip-Slip can be found in the white paper published by Snyk: Zip Slip Vulnerability
But I had a guard in place, why wasn't it sufficient?
If the changes you see are a change to the guard, not the addition of a new guard, this is probably because this code contains a Zip-Slip vulnerability due to a partial path traversal vulnerability.
To demonstrate this vulnerability, consider
"/usr/outnot".startsWith("/usr/out")
.The check is bypassed although
/outnot
is not under the/out
directory.It's important to understand that the terminating slash may be removed when using various
String
representations of theFile
object.For example, on Linux,
println(new File("/var"))
will print/var
, butprintln(new File("/var", "/")
will print/var/
;however,
println(new File("/var", "/").getCanonicalPath())
will print/var
.The Fix
Implementing a guard comparing paths with the method
java.nio.files.Path#startsWith
will adequately protect against this vulnerability.For example:
file.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(BASE_DIRECTORY)
orfile.getCanonicalFile().toPath().startsWith(BASE_DIRECTORY_FILE.getCanonicalFile().toPath())
Other Examples
➡️ Vulnerability Disclosure ⬅️
👋 Vulnerability disclosure is a super important part of the vulnerability handling process and should not be skipped! This may be completely new to you, and that's okay, I'm here to assist!
First question, do we need to perform vulnerability disclosure? It depends!
For partial path traversal, consider if user-supplied input could ever flow to this logic. If user-supplied input could reach this conditional, it's insufficient and, as such, most likely a vulnerability.
Vulnerability Disclosure How-To
You have a few options options to perform vulnerability disclosure. However, I'd like to suggest the following 2 options:
JLLeitschuh Disclosure
in the subject of your email so it is not missed.Detecting this and Future Vulnerabilities
You can automatically detect future vulnerabilities like this by enabling the free (for open-source) GitHub Action.
I'm not an employee of GitHub, I'm simply an open-source security researcher.
Source
This contribution was automatically generated with an OpenRewrite refactoring recipe, which was lovingly handcrafted to bring this security fix to your repository.
The source code that generated this PR can be found here:
Zip Slip
Why didn't you disclose privately (ie. coordinated disclosure)?
This PR was automatically generated, in-bulk, and sent to this project as well as many others, all at the same time.
This is technically what is called a "Full Disclosure" in vulnerability disclosure, and I agree it's less than ideal. If GitHub offered a way to create private pull requests to submit pull requests, I'd leverage it, but that infrastructure, sadly, doesn't exist yet.
The problem is that, as an open source software security researcher, I (exactly like open source maintainers), I only have so much time in a day. I'm able to find vulnerabilities impacting hundreds, or sometimes thousands of open source projects with tools like GitHub Code Search and CodeQL. The problem is that my knowledge of vulnerabilities doesn't scale very well.
Individualized vulnerability disclosure takes time and care. It's a long and tedious process, and I have a significant amount of experience with it (I have over 50 CVEs to my name). Even tracking down the reporting channel (email, Jira, etc..) can take time and isn't automatable. Unfortunately, when facing problems of this scale, individual reporting doesn't work well either.
Additionally, if I just spam out emails or issues, I'll just overwhelm already over-taxed maintainers, I don't want to do this either.
By creating a pull request, I am aiming to provide maintainers something highly actionable to actually fix the identified vulnerability; a pull request.
There's a larger discussion on this topic that can be found here: JLLeitschuh/security-research#12
Opting Out
If you'd like to opt out of future automated security vulnerability fixes like this, please consider adding a file called
.github/GH-ROBOTS.txt
to your repository with the line:This bot will respect the ROBOTS.txt format for future contributions.
Alternatively, if this project is no longer actively maintained, consider archiving the repository.
CLA Requirements
This section is only relevant if your project requires contributors to sign a Contributor License Agreement (CLA) for external contributions.
It is unlikely that I'll be able to directly sign CLAs. However, all contributed commits are already automatically signed off.
If signing your organization's CLA is a strict-requirement for merging this contribution, please feel free to close this PR.
Sponsorship & Support
This contribution is sponsored by HUMAN Security Inc. and the new Dan Kaminsky Fellowship, a fellowship created to celebrate Dan's memory and legacy by funding open-source work that makes the world a better (and more secure) place.
This PR was generated by Moderne, a free-for-open source SaaS offering that uses format-preserving AST transformations to fix bugs, standardize code style, apply best practices, migrate library versions, and fix common security vulnerabilities at scale.
Tracking
All PR's generated as part of this fix are tracked here: JLLeitschuh/security-research#16